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I’m sorry you are such an arsehole: (non-)canonical apologies and their 
implications for (im)politeness 
 
Abstract 
I report on a study into how native British English speakers (N=78) respond to various instances of I’m sorry 
played to them in an experimental setting.  The test items vary in terms of what the speaker is ‘sorry’ for, but are 
controlled such that the intonation of I’m sorry is kept the same throughout and the recordings are all produced 
by the same speaker.  The results present some challenges for our current thinking about (im)politeness.   In 
particular, examples which we could classify as ‘verbal formula mismatches’ (Culpeper, 2011: 174) such as I’m 
sorry you are such an arsehole are unexpectedly treated by a significant minority of respondents as being ‘proper’ 
apologies.  I explore how we can account for this type of response and argue that Jucker & Taavitsainen’s (2008:6) 
suggestion that speech acts are ‘fuzzy concepts’ which ‘require a prototype approach’ is a productive one.  I 
outline the parameters along which apologies can be more or less prototypical, including the identifiability of the 
offence and the speaker’s perceived attitude towards it.   
 
1.0 Introduction 
Utterances where there is a clash between usually polite and impolite messages such as the 
titular I’m sorry you are such an arsehole have been discussed by a number of politeness 
scholars in recent years (e.g. Culpeper’s 2011:174f verbal formula mismatches; Aijmer, 2015 
on please used non-canonically; Leech’s, 2014: 238f attitude clashes; Taylor, 2016: chapter 2 
on im/politeness mismatch).  Such examples are of interest because they present a challenge 
for our accounts of (im)politeness – if a speaker wishes to be impolite, then why pepper their 
talk with canonically polite expressions?1   
 
In this paper, I move away from thinking about the intention behind such utterances, instead 
considering how they are interpreted by hearers.  I report on a study which saw respondents 
asked to rate how apologetic a speaker was (amongst other things) in response to a number of 
utterances beginning with I’m sorry – some typical apologies, and others where there is a clash.  
The aim of this was two-fold: to see whether hearers do treat I’m sorrys which precede 
insults/strong criticism (i.e. impolite messages) as non-apologies (to use Kampf’s (2009) 
terminology) as we would expect, and if that is the case, whether this holds true for all hearers.   
 
The findings of this empirical investigation motivate a more theoretical discussion of how we 
can account for the language users’ interpretations of apologies.  The main thrust of the paper 
will suggest that the evidence points in the direction of supporting Jucker & Taavitsainen’s 
view that speech acts are ‘fuzzy concepts’ which ‘require a prototype approach’ (2008:6).  In 
light of the findings here, and previous work on apologies (in particular Murphy, 2015, 2016; 
Kampf, 2009; Robinson, 2004, 2006), I propose the most salient parameters to account for 
(non-)canonical apologies.  These relate to the identifiability of the offence, the speaker’s 
responsibility for it and the speaker’s perceived attitude towards it, amongst other things. 
                                                             
1 A reviewer makes the helpful point that in political discourse, this phenomenon can be 
explained by what de Ayala (2001: 163f) calls ‘institutionalized hypocrisy’.  An institutional 
frame can compel a speaker to reduce the threat of highly hostile expressions with token 
politeness.  It may well be that this is not simply a feature of institutional talk. 
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The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2, I will review some of the most relevant 
literature to this study; in section 3, I discuss the methodology which informs the experimental 
study; in section 4, I highlight the most salient results from the experiment; in section 5, I 
discuss these results and explain why I think they support the view that apologies (as well as 
other speech acts) are best considered as prototype entities as opposed to entities defined by 
static felicity conditions; in the final section, I offer conclusions and suggestions for further 
work. 
 
2.0 Literature review 
In this section I will outline papers relating to apologising writ large, on the multifunctional 
nature of the token (I’m) sorry, and clashes between politeness and impoliteness. 
 
2.1 Apologising and sorry 
Goffman suggested that apologies see a speaker split herself2 in two: a bad half which caused 
an offence to the apology recipient, and a good half which recognises the offence and seeks to 
remedy it (Goffman, 1971: 110ff).  It is through the production of the apology that the speaker 
seeks to repair social relations with her interlocutor – in this respect, apologies are performative 
acts.   
 
Viewing apologies as being performative speech acts, a number of researchers (e.g. Murphy, 
2015; Ogierman, 2009; Owen, 1984) have sought to provide felicity conditions for the act of 
apologising – in other words, criteria which need to be met for an utterance to be treated as an 
apology.  These vary in their detail but they include matters such as: the act being apologised 
for was carried out by the apologiser (or someone she represents); that the speaker believes the 
act to be in some way an offence; that the speaker regrets the act in question.  These matters 
will be important when it comes to thinking about why speakers may (or may not) treat an I’m 
sorry token as a ‘proper’ apology. 
 
Moving away from what an apology is to how it is commonly carried out, Deutschmann makes 
the point that ‘apologising tends to be accompanied by a limited set of easily identifiable 
routine formulae’ (Deutschmann, 2003: 36).  Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984) identify a variety 
of illocutionary force indicating devices for the speech act of apology, including: I apologise, 
(I’m) sorry, pardon me, excuse me, and I regret.  These may or may not be accompanied with 
other elements which make the apology more elaborate.  Aijmer (1996: 85) finds that 
utterances containing sorry are by far the most common means of apologising in the London-
Lund Corpus.  This is also found by Deutschmann in his study of the British National Corpus 
(2003: 51).  
 
Whilst (I’m) sorry is the most common form of apology, at least in British English, it is not 
restricted to simply apologising.  I’m sorry is frequently used in expressions of sympathy (I’m 
                                                             
2 For convenience, I will refer to speakers using feminine pronouns and hearers with masculine 
ones. 
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sorry for your loss as perhaps the go-to instance of this).   In noting that I’m sorry occurs in 
both sympathetic and apologetic utterances, Smith (2008: 35) suggests that this ‘leads to a lack 
of clarity regarding the role of causation in apologies, which in turn creates a variety of 
confusions and possibilities for manipulation’.  It is also one of the reasons that Murphy (2015) 
suggests that I’m sorry is not an explicit form for apologising, but rather a generalised 
conversational implicature which by default issues an apology, but otherwise can perform these 
sympathetic uses, and as I will show later, more challenging functions (see Levinson, 2000).  
This multifunctionality associated with I’m sorry (which is not evidence in I apologise), is why 
this study focusses on this form. 
 
2.2 Non-apologies and verbal formula mismatches 
Kampf (2009) suggests that politicians calculate the costs and benefits to offering apologies in 
the public sphere.  He proposes that in so doing the politician may produce an apology which 
is in some way evasive since this ‘can be useful from the speaker’s point of view precisely due 
to the various meanings that may be assigned to his ambiguous utterance’ (Kampf, 2009: 2260).  
Kampf gives a thorough-going analysis of the ways in which Israeli public figures give non-
apologies, i.e. utterances which equivocate when it comes to apologising. 
 
Whilst it may be the case that non-apologies are more prevalent in public discourse, I think it 
would be wrong to suggest that they do not feature in quotidian conversation – after all, 
apologisers in everyday life are conducting similar cost-benefits analyses when producing their 
apologies.  I am interested in this paper to see how such so-called non-apologies are reacted to, 
whether they are, indeed, treated as infelicitous. 
 
Culpeper (2011: 174ff) discusses how conventionalised politeness formulae can precede 
impolite utterances, giving the paradigm example: ‘Could you just fuck off?’ where the polite 
expectations set up by the conventionally indirect (polite) request form clash with the impolite 
message conveyed by ‘fuck off’.  He calls examples likes this verbal formula mismatches.  
Other examples adduced include no offence, and with respect being used before offensive and 
disrespectful messages respectively.  Whilst Culpeper does not draw attention to the use of I’m 
sorry in possible verbal formula mismatches, it is clear that this polite token can be used to 
preface impolite expressions.  This type of mixed expression is becoming conventionalised, 
according to Culpeper, such that a hearer can recognised ‘the impolite meaning projected by 
the conventionalised mixed message’ (Culpeper, 2011: 178).   
 
In this paper, I propose to explore this by seeing whether hearers treat I’m sorrys in verbal 
formula mismatches as being apologies (which we would not expect if this impoliteness has 
become conventionalised).  This develops on a paper by Kampf & Blum-Kulka (2011) into the 
interpretation of the Hebrew equivalent of I’m sorry.  They show that hearers, on the whole, 
treat I’m sorrys in verbal formula mismatches as being adversarial, rather than apologetic.  
However, they find a minority of respondents treating such utterances as apologies proper.  
This study will explore whether the same is true for (British) English, and seek to explain such 
behaviours.  
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3.0 Methodology 
 
In order to explore whether or not I’m sorry was interpreted differently when in utterances 
which would be described by Culpeper (2011) as a ‘verbal formula mismatch’ or by Kampf 
(2009) as a ‘non-apology’, I carried out a questionnaire in which respondents were played 
recordings of various utterances which began with I’m sorry.  Respondents could play the 
utterance three times and were then prompted to answer a variety of questions relating to the 
recording.  They did this for each of the 16 utterances in the experiment.   
 
3.1 Test phrases 
 
The following 16 test phrases were selected – a mixture of ‘proper’ apologies,  expressions of 
sympathy, possible non-apologies and I’m sorrys which preface a face-attack: 
 
 Test phrase Suggested type of utterance 
1 I’m sorry I won’t be able to come ‘Proper’ apologies 
2 I’m sorry I upset you 
3 I’m sorry I completely forgot to do it 
4 I’m sorry you haven’t been seen yet 
5 I’m sorry you won’t be able to come Expressions of sympathy 
6 I’m sorry to hear that 
7 I’m sorry about that Non-apology by blurring the 
offence (Kampf, 2009: 
2265ff) 
8 I’m sorry for the mistake 
9 I’m sorry if I’ve upset you Non-apology by non-
performativity (Kampf, 
2009: 2262) 
10 I’m sorry you feel that way Non-apology by omitting or 
blurring the agent (Kampf, 
2009: 2268f) 
11 I’m sorry you’ve been made to feel that way 
12 I’m sorry you can’t speak to people like that ?Verbal formula mismatch 
13 I’m sorry you’ve pushed me too far 
14 I’m sorry your behaviour has been appalling 
15 I’m sorry he is such an arsehole Verbal formula mismatch 
(Culpeper, 2011: 174) 16 I’m sorry you are such an arsehole 
Table 1: List of test examples 
 
Each test item is made up of I’m sorry and the apologisable (i.e. the thing that could possibly 
be being apologised for) only.  There is no embellishment of the type often found in everyday 
apologies, e.g. promise of non-recurrence ‘that won’t happen again’; offer of repair ‘let me 
pay for a new one’, etc. (see Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984 for more examples).  This was done 
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so that the focus of the participant is directed towards the use of I’m sorry over and above any 
additional elements.   
 
The decision to keep the apology token the same (i.e. as I’m sorry) was also a deliberate one – 
elsewhere it has been argued that I’m sorry is a token which performs the apology by default 
but not explicitly, i.e. it is a generalised conversational implicature (Murphy, 2015).  This 
potential multifunctionality is what is of interest in this paper and this is not shared with explicit 
apologies like I apologise and I offer my apologies.  Moreover, simply saying sorry, without 
the explicit subject, is typically associated with discourse management matters rather than bona 
fide apologies (Mattson Bean & Johnstone, 1994). 
 
Notice that examples 12-16 could felicitously have the connective but between the I’m sorry 
and what follows; the effect of this would make explicit that there was a contrast/concession 
between the putative apology and the rest of the utterance3.  I chose not to include but in these 
examples as I would be concerned that this conventional implicature4 might be seen as the 
driver behind participants spotting the potential mismatch.  
 
It was felt important to keep the same speaker for each of the phrases to ensure that extraneous 
variables like speaker gender (cf. Schumann & Ross, 2010), or how nice the speaker sounded 
(cf. Ambady et al., 2002 which suggested that 10 second voice samples from doctors were 
sufficient for participants to come to a view on the warmth or otherwise of the doctor) were 
not introduced.   
 
In addition, intonation was a consideration.  Aijmer (1996: 88) indicates that a ‘fall-rise or 
rising tone was most common in casual apologies’ in the London-Lund Corpus, but quoting 
Lindström that ‘[w]ith a low fall the apology tends to sound more genuine and regretful’ 
(Lindström, 1978: 177, quoted in Aijmer, 1996: 89).  So that intonation did not ‘give the game 
away’ about the possible differences between the test items, the same I’m sorry was used in all 
16 examples.  The token was produced with a low fall (see Figure 1).   In addition, the same 
gap (or rather lack of one) between I’m sorry and the rest of the utterance was maintained.  This 
was done in order to ensure consistency across all 16 test items.  In order that the examples 
sounded natural, the intonation of the rest of the test item (i.e. everything after sorry) varied. 
 
                                                             
3 It would also be possible to place but after sorry in examples 1, 3 and 5.  The effect would, I 
think, be similar but this merits further investigation. 
4 I stick to the Gricean view that but carries conventional implicature – i.e. it is part of the 
agreed word meaning of the lexical item – in this case, of concession or contrast (Grice, 1989: 
42ff).  Potts (2005: 213ff) suggests that but is not a conventional implicature and Bach (1999) 
denies the existence of conventional implicatures altogether.  These are debates for elsewhere, 
but that they are being had reinforces my view that it is best to avoid including but in these 
examples. 
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Figure 1: The intonation contour of one of the test items (taken using Boersma & Weenik’s (2013) Praat) 
 
3.2 The questionnaire 
 
Participants accessed the questionnaire individually online and could complete it at their own 
pace (but once the questionnaire was opened it had to be completed in one sitting).  Each 
participant was presented with the 16 test phrases one at a time and in a semi-random order, 
such that like phrases would not appear consecutively (e.g. test phrases 2 & 9 amongst others 
would always be separated by at least two other test phrases).   
 
The respondents were asked to rate each example for how apologetic they thought the speaker 
was from 0 (not at all apologetic) to 6 (completely apologetic).  In addition, participants were 
asked to consider how bad the speaker felt, from 0 (Doesn’t feel bad at all) to 6 (Feels very 
bad).   
 
After focussing on their views of the speaker’s feelings, respondents were then asked to 
imagine how they would feel following the utterance they heard – from -6 (Completely worse) 
to 6 (Completely better), with 0 (Neither better nor worse) as the mid-point.   
 
Finally, participants were asked whether or not they thought the speaker was apologising (a 
forced yes or no choice) and to give a reason for their response (no more than 350 characters).  
The questionnaire was limited to these 5 questions (generating 80 data points per participant) 
to avoid informant fatigue (though this was still evident for some participants).   
 
3.3 The participants 
All participants were native British English speakers and were first year undergraduate students 
of Linguistics who had not yet had any instruction in pragmatics/semantics. Click-through rates 
were monitored and those participants who either: did not click play on the extracts at all, or 
had suspiciously quick response times (i.e. completed all five questions in 15 seconds or less 
and entered gibberish in the free-response question) were excluded entirely from the results.  
This left 78 participants – demographic information was not collected as this was not the focus 
of the study (although given the average undergraduate linguistics class in the U.K., I would 
venture that the vast majority were female and aged 18-25). 
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4.0 Results 
 
Table 2 shows the average scores for each of the test items, as well as the percentage of 
participants who answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘Is the speaker apologising here?’. 
 
 Test phrase Apologetic 
(average score /6) 
Feels 
bad 
(average 
score /6) 
H. feels 
worse/better 
afterwards 
(average 
score 
between -6 
to 6) 
% who say 
the speaker 
is 
apologising 
1 I’m sorry I won’t be able 
to come 
5.0 4.4 2.6 93.6% 
2 I’m sorry I upset you 4.9 5.0 4.2 94.9% 
3 I’m sorry I completely 
forgot to do it 
5.1 5.0 1.7 89.7% 
4 I’m sorry you haven’t 
been seen yet 
4.4 3.1 -0.7 85.9% 
5 I’m sorry you won’t be 
able to come 
4.9 4.3 -3.9 93.6% 
6 I’m sorry to hear that 3.5 4.9 3.2 46.1% 
7 I’m sorry about that 4.3 3.0 2.9 79.5% 
8 I’m sorry for the mistake 4.0 3.2 1.8 82.1% 
9 I’m sorry if I’ve upset you 2.8 3.5 0.8 33.3% 
10 I’m sorry you feel that way 1.3 1.7 -4.0 28.2% 
11 I’m sorry you’ve been 
made to feel that way 
2.6 1.8 -3.3 33.3% 
12 I’m sorry you can’t speak 
to people like that 
1.9 2.1 -4.2 43.6% 
13 I’m sorry you’ve pushed 
me too far 
2.1 5.4 -4.6 26.9% 
14 I’m sorry your behaviour 
has been appalling 
1.8 4.7 -5.2 29.5% 
15 I’m sorry he is such an 
arsehole 
2.3 5.1 0.9 34.6% 
16 I’m sorry you are such an 
arsehole 
1.8 4.5 -4.4 29.5% 
Table 2: Group (N=78) averages in response to each I'm sorry utterance 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, participants view the speaker as more apologetic when saying sorry 
for more tangible offences (examples 1-4) compared to the less canonical instances (examples 
12-16).  Indeed, only a minority of participants describe the speaker as apologising in examples 
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12-16 – albeit a not insignificant minority, and this is something I will pick up again at length 
in the next section.  The question of the speaker feeling bad gets a relatively high average score 
for both sets of I’m sorrys – the speaker asserting that the hearer’s behaviour has been appalling 
and potentially upsetting them (ex. 14) is said to feel just as bad on average as when she is 
apologising for having upset the hearer (ex. 2).  It seems that participants believe that she feels 
bad in one case because she has been wronged and in the other because she has done wrong5. 
 
The non-apology examples are also of interest.  The two examples of non-apology by blurring 
the offence (exx.7-8) score quite highly in terms of how apologetic the speaker is viewed as 
and in both cases more than three-quarters of respondents treat these as apologies.  This does 
not mean that Kampf (2009) is wrong to categorise these as non-apologies – I think if the 
participants were given more context rather than being left to imagine their own contexts, then 
these results would likely have been different.  What is interesting to note, however, is how 
these instances of non-apologies contrast to the others where the agent is blurred (ex. 10-11) 
or there is some form of non-performativity (ex. 9, in this case: conditionality).  These non-
apologies are received very badly by participants – only a minority state that the speaker is 
apologising and the group rate her ‘apologeticness’ very low.  It is worth mentioning, however, 
that some participants give a score of 1 or 2 (even 3 in some cases) for how apologetic the 
speaker is, even though they go on to answer ‘no’ to the question of ‘Is the speaker 
apologising?’.  This strikes me as curious; I would have anticipated that if a respondent said 
that they speaker was not apologising then they would have rated her as being not at all 
apologetic (i.e. a rating of 0).  This suggests that there is more to ‘doing’ an apology than 
simply being thought of as feeling somewhat apologetic.  This is something I will return to in 
the next section. 
 
Example 5 (‘I’m sorry you won’t be able to come’) was intended as an expression of sympathy 
when the test materials were written and so I thought it surprising that so many respondents 
treated this as an apology.  I had hoped to say something exciting in light of it that the sympathy 
sense of sorry was being lost to the apology sense – but then I read the respondents’ qualitative 
comments answering the question of why they thought this was an apology.  Rather than 
hearing this as something like: I’m sad/disappointed to hear that you are unable to make the 
party/event/etc., virtually all the respondents reported that the person was apologising because 
they weren’t invited/weren’t allowed/were banned from(!) coming to the event.  I, therefore, 
will not dwell on example 5, but I mention it explicitly as a reminder that it is always 
worthwhile ensuring that participants are answering what you think they are answering. 
 
The other ‘sympathy’ example (6: ‘I’m sorry to hear that’) does see the anticipated drop in 
responses suggesting that this is an apology.  Just over half did not see this as an apology, and 
                                                             
5 There was a cluster of respondents (N=6) who rated the speaker in ex. 16 (‘I’m sorry you are 
such an arsehole’) as not feeling bad at all (i.e. a score of 0).  In their comments, they said that 
the speaker was not apologising and that they did not have a need to because it was ‘just banter’ 
(or words to that effect).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss banter or jocular 
mockery any further, but others in this special issue do (see papers by Aijmer and Beeching). 
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the ratings for the speaker feeling bad were high (suggesting the idea that the speaker feels bad 
for the recipient).  It is also interesting to note that such expressions of sympathy were rated as 
potentially making the participant feel better.  Of those who did say example 6 was an apology, 
there were a few comments which suggested that it would be an apology if the speaker had 
done something wrong.  There was a particularly interesting comment along these lines of: 
 
It’s the sort of thing someone says when they’ve been 
caught out and don’t want to say sorry properly.   
 
Comments like this – particularly invoking the idea of doing a speech act ‘properly’ – suggest 
that some respondents may accept that a speaker is apologising, but may be, in some way, 
dissatisfied with it.  They may view the speaker as ‘going through the motions’ (cf. Wachtel, 
1980).  This sort of metapragmatic comment supports the view which I will outline in the next 
section, that there is a continuum of performativity – it is not simply the case that someone 
apologises or not, but there is a spectrum of apology-like behaviour. 
 
This also has a bearing on the findings relating to feeling better/worse as a result of the 
utterance.  Take a comment in response to example 4 which the participant agreed was an 
apology: 
   
At the doctors they just say this but you know they aren’t 
really bothered and you probs aren’t gonna get seen any 
time soon 
 
So whilst an apology might have the intention of repairing damaged relations, it need not 
necessarily fulfil that goal to still be thought of as being an apology.   
 
5.0 Discussion 
In this section, I will propose an account for the issues which emerge from the results just 
discussed, as well as previous studies into apologising both in everyday life and political 
discourse.  
 
Firstly, I offer a summary of some of the matters that need to be taken into consideration: 
 
1) People do not always agree on what counts as an apology 
2) Even verbal formula mismatches (i.e. where I’m sorry precedes some sort of impolite 
comment) are treated by some as apologies proper 
3) There is a spectrum of how apology-like certain actions are 
 
So how do hearers make judgements about whether the use of I’m sorry is performing the 
speech act of apology?  And why do these judgements vary between speakers?  Here is where 
I believe the notion of the prototype is useful. 
 
Jucker & Taavitsainen suggest that “speech acts are fuzzy concepts” which “can be analysed 
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in relation to neighbouring speech acts, to their changing cultural groundings, and to ways in 
which they are realised” and that their fuzziness “requires a prototype approach; individual 
instances vary in their degree of conformity to their prototypical manifestations and sometimes 
the group identity is only vague” (Jucker & Taavitsainen, 2008:6).  I believe modelling speech 
acts as prototype elements gives further explanation for why some sorrys are viewed as more 
apologetic than others, and in different ways by different hearers. 
 
This is not, however, the first time that apologising has been considered from a prototype 
perspective. Jeffries (2007:63ff) proposes fourteen parameters along which the utterance can 
be more or less like an apology. These parameters include: type of expression used, tense of 
the utterance, person used therein, seriousness of offence, the responsibility of the apologiser, 
etc. I believe that some of these parameters are important in deciding whether an act is more 
or less like an apology, but others less so6 .  
 
For instance, if we think about the tense of an utterance, this can have not just an effect on 
whether it is a central exemplar of an apology, but can prevent it being an apology at all. I was 
sorry and I will be sorry, for instance, represent changes in tense from the simple present, which 
Jeffries’ views as the most prototypical way of apologising, but change the act in question from 
being an apology to being a report and a commitment respectively.  Even changing the phrasing 
to something like I have said sorry is still likely to be treated as a non-apology (cf. Kampf, 
2009).  Moreover, changing the illocutionary force indicating device to the explicit apologise 
and manipulating the tense is still problematic (I have apologised still conveys a report of an 
apology).  So it is for this reason that I will argue that we need to remove parameters related to 
form from the discussion of prototypicality of the act.  
 
That aside, Jeffries suggests that an apology which is accepted is more prototypical than one 
which is rejected. Indeed, she suggests that ‘many of the other [prototypical] features may be 
lacking if the wronged person is willing to accept the communicative act as an apology’ 
(Jeffries, 2007:62). I am minded to agree that uptake here is important; in the questionnaire 
design I explicitly included a question on whether or not the respondent believed the speaker 
was apologising to get at whether the utterance was treated as an apology.  What I would say, 
however, is that, in interaction, the central exemplars of apology would not have explicit 
acceptance of the apology as the uptake but rather, as Robinson (2004) argues, the preferred 
response of rejecting the need to apologise.  In addition, absence of uptake or even rejection of 
the apology does not mean that an apology has not happened; unlike, for instance, a lack of 
uptake to a bet means that a bet has not been entered into. Instead, a rejection of an apology 
simply means that the intended perlocutionary effect has not been realised – this naturally 
                                                             
6 The full list of parameters is as follows: i) IFID used; ii) tense/aspect of IFID; iii) person of 
the verb; iv) contents of the following text; v) level/seriousness of the ‘wrong’; vi) timing of 
the ‘wrong’; vii) sincerity of the apologiser; viii) addressee of the apology; ix) responsibility 
of the apologiser; x) impetus (whether the apology was solicited or not); xi) best interests of 
the apologisee; xii) equality of apologiser/apologisee; xiii) whether the apologiser intends the 
act to be an apology; xiv) whether the apology is accepted. 
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makes the apology in question less prototypical, but does not mean that it has not been 
performed.  This is an important distinction to bear in mind, especially in light of what 
participants said earlier – that a speaker might failed to offer a ‘proper’ apology, but they still 
might view her as apologising. 
 
In the rest of this section, I will outline what I think to be the most important parameters which 
help discern a more prototypical apology from a less prototypical one.  The first two of these 
parameters are informed by the results from this paper (and to a lesser extent parameter 3), the 
rest are adduced in light of previous work on apologies. 
 
5.1 Parameter 1: Identifiability of the offence 
 
←Less prototypical        More prototypical→  
Dubious     Effortful     Straightforward  
 
If an offence is easily identifiable, either because it comes immediately after the offence, a 
complaint, or is referenced by the apologiser, then the apology is a more central exemplar.   It 
is clear how examples 1-5 and 8 would fall on the more prototypical end of the spectrum – the 
apologiser references (to a greater or lesser extent) the apologisable.  It is also conceivable that 
when responding to example 7 (I’m sorry about that) hearers imagined a context in which the 
apology arose and that involved a complaint or the performance of an offence.   
 
Offence identification might be considered more effortful in cases not discussed so far in this 
paper such as when a speaker uses an apology token to seek clarification.  It could be that in 
saying I’m sorry (usually with rising intonation) as a means of other-initiated other-repair 
(Levinson, 1983: 340-1) the apologiser believes they are at fault because she was not listening 
carefully enough, but equally the seeking of repair work could be taken as a complaint levelled 
at the interlocutor for not being clear (see Robinson, 2006 and Aijmer, 1996: 102-3).  It is for 
this reason that I would suggest that offence identification in such cases is more effortful.  
 
If the attempt to identify the nature of the offence results in only a dubious offence or something 
which might actually be construed as an offence committed by the hearer, then the apology in 
question is least prototypical. This end of the spectrum would cover things like: i) a situation 
where a speaker says sorry when her toe has been run over by someone dragging a suitcase in 
a busy train station; ii) apologies which preface disagreement or contradiction; iii) ironical uses 
of the apology.  
 
I propose that one of the ways for the analyst to assess the ease of identifiability of the offence 
is to consider whether or not it forms part of the at-issue content of the utterance, that is to say 
the information which ‘hearers will expect […] to constitute the speaker’s central message’ 
(Potts, 2015: 168).  In cases where the offence is easily discernible, it should not form part of 
the at-issue content, it should be backgrounded.  Tonhauser (2012) proposes a variety of ways 
to discern the at-issue content; unfortunately, none of these are directly applicable when it 
comes to looking at performatives.  Instead, I suggest a development which I will call the 
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‘Really? Test’.  We can take one of the test examples and intuit how the discourse would 
continue if the apologisee were to respond by saying with some incredulity: ‘Really?’.  For 
instance (test example 2): 
 
A: I’m sorry I upset you 
B: Really? 
A: Yes, I am sorry/#Yes I did upset you 
 
In this case, what is at-issue (i.e. the main point of the utterance) is the apology itself and not 
the offence triggering the apology.  Contrast that with example 14 which when subjected to the 
Really? Test would most likely (for me at least) generate the following: 
 
  A: I’m sorry your behaviour has been appalling 
  B: Really? 
  A: #Yes, I am sorry/Yes, it has been appalling 
 
In this case, the I’m sorry is not the main focus of the utterance but the following face-
threatening/attacking act.  As such, it is far more effortful to try to work out what the speaker 
could possibly be apologising for, if the I’m sorry is to be treated as a bona fide apology. 
 
The three points that I have suggested (straightforward, effortful, dubious) on the continuum 
are not the only places at which an apology might be found; it is possible that some offences 
are more straightforwardly identifiable than others, for example. Not only that, different 
speakers – based on their own experiences – are likely to gauge the identifiability of offences 
differently.  One of the respondents, for instance, suggests that in the case of I’m sorry you are 
such an arsehole that the offence being apologised for is the imminent insult, but contra 
Culpeper (2011: 175) who suggests that the polite token is blatant lip-service being paid to 
politeness: 
 
They probably don’t want to be mean but they might feel like 
they have to. 
 
Others, and likely particularly those who did not view this as being an apology, would agree 
with Culpeper here – it is highly suspect for the speaker to be apologising for the imminent 
face-attack; the use of I’m sorry here may well be a form of lip-service.  The fact that language-
users come to different views of these utterances is all the more reason to consider speech-acts 
as prototype entities, since we would expect this form of categorisation to be highly dependent 
on personal experience and individual cognitive processes. 
 
5.2 Parameter 2: Speaker’s perceived attitude toward the offence 
 
←Less prototypical        More prototypical→ 
 Feels there was no offence   Feels indifferent  Feels bad (esp. for the recipient) 
against the recipient 
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Deciding on how a speaker feels about the offence for which she is apologising is naturally 
fraught with difficulty, but judging the apologiser’s sincerity is something which recipients do. 
Hearers may judge whether the apologiser feels bad about the offence on the basis of, among 
other things, her body language and facial expressions. For instance, she may struggle to 
maintain eye contact (Modigliani, 1971) or she might engage in self-touching behaviours 
(Freedman & Bucci, 1981; LeCompte, 1981) – all signs given-off, to use Goffman’s (1959) 
terminology, which indicate the speaker’s feeling negative emotion.   
 
But as we have seen from the results of this task, the words used to produce an apology will 
also affect how the recipient perceives the speaker’s attitude toward the offence.  I’m sorry you 
feel that way receives an extremely low rating when it comes to how bad the speaker is believed 
to feel and is viewed as an apology by only a third of speakers.  By pushing the responsibility 
of the offence on to apologise, the speaker at the very least feels indifferent about what she has 
done to cause upset or feels that she has not committed an offence at all.   
 
I suggest that this sense of feeling bad should especially be directed towards the recipient of 
the apology.  I say this in light of examples like 13, I’m sorry you’ve pushed me too far.  Here, 
respondents rate the speaker as feeling bad (indeed, the highest rating in this category across 
all 16 test utterances) but only the minority believe the speaker to be apologising.  I suggest 
that participants are rating the speaker as feeling bad, not because of anything she has done, 
but because she has been made to feel that way.  As such, she does not feel bad for the recipient 
of the ‘sorry’ token, but because of the recipient.  This would, therefore, be a less prototypical 
example. 
 
A final, perhaps even less prototypical scenario, would be apologies which are prompted only 
by the intervention of a third party, where certainly the apologiser but also possibly the 
apologisee feels no offence has occurred.  This type of example was highlighted in Murphy 
(2015: 181) where an overhearing mother reprimands her son so that he apologises, despite 
neither apologiser nor purported offended party believing there had been an offence.  
 
5.3 Parameter 3: Speaker’s apparent responsibility for the offence 
 
←Less prototypical        More prototypical→  
Apologiser’s transportable  T.I. indirectly involved  T.I directly involved 
identity not involved  
 
Apologies which are for offences which the apologiser committed will be most prototypical.  
Examples like I’m sorry your behaviour has been appalling are interesting – if we view the 
offence as being that the speaker is having to say something face-attacking (as was identified 
in a roundabout way by some participants), then the recipient could be argued to carry some 
responsibility that this offence has come about.  (Whether a recipient would likely acknowledge 
this in the moment is a debate for another day, but again, this source of inter-speaker variation 
is another reason why a prototype approach has its merits). 
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The inclusion of the notion of ‘transportable identity’ in this parameter (Zimmerman, 1998) is 
mostly inspired by work on historical apologies, i.e. apologies aimed at bringing about 
reconciliation between a government/company/public body and a group of wronged parties 
following an extended period between the offence and the apology.  A number of studies 
(Marrus, 2006: 13; Tavuchis, 1991:71ff) discuss the fact that these apologies are treated with 
scepticism.  The reasons for this scepticism are manifold, but the most frequently cited aspect: 
the apologies are most often given by people neither directly nor indirectly responsible for the 
action. Given that, I think it makes sense to include this parameter in the calculation of the 
prototype apology.  
 
Here the different identities which speakers occupy during talk – discourse, situational and 
transportable (Zimmerman, 1998) – will be useful in explaining how responsibility for the 
offence can be viewed on a scale. Discourse identities are those which are assumed by 
participants ‘as they engage in various sequentially organized activities’ (Zimmerman, 
1998:90). For our purposes, the important discourse identities for the act of apologising are 
apologiser and apologisee. Situational identities are brought into being by being a participant 
in a certain activity, so imagine example 4 (I’m sorry you haven’t been seen yet) did take place 
in a doctor’s surgery: receptionist—patient identities would be invoked in this scenario.  
Transportable identities, however, are the aspect which I argue affect the prototypicality of the 
apology. Zimmerman suggests that transportable identities are “latent identities which ‘tag 
along’ with individuals as they move through their daily routines” (ibid.).  Zimmerman 
suggests visible indicators such as race, gender, age, etc. as forming part of a transportable 
identity. To those visible indicators we can also add issues related to participants’ previous 
experience of the individual in question – whether she is a crashing bore, owes money to a 
participant, or perhaps of most relevance to us, has previously been involved in wrongdoing 
constituting an offence.  
 
In the most prototypical cases, where the speaker has a discourse identity of apologiser, her 
transportable identity of ‘offender’ will also be directly oriented to in the action of apologising.  
Slightly less prototypical are cases such as a parent apologising for their child, or a receptionist 
apologising that the doctor is running late. Here transportable identity is still relevant (but less 
so) because the apologiser’s identity as someone who is bringing up or organises the schedule 
of the offender is what is oriented to.  
 
The least prototypical apologies are ones which do not involve the transportable identity at all, 
such as historical apologies. Here the apologiser is not identified as being the offender who 
was involved (either directly or indirectly) in the acts discussed in the apology. She is able to 
apologise by virtue of her discourse identity (of an apologiser) and, most importantly, her 
situational identity of ‘politician called on to apologise’ and who represents her predecessors 
and the nation. 
 
 
5.4 Parameter 4: Identity of the recipient  
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←Less prototypical        More prototypical→  
Transportable identity not involved  T.I. indirectly involved  T.I directly involved  
 
This parameter concerns the status of those who the apology is directed at. Here we consider 
the inverse aspect of transportable identity, where the individual has had a wrong done to them.  
The most central exemplars of apology will have the offended party as a/the recipient – in these 
cases the apologisee’s transportable identity as a ‘victim’ (for want of a better term) is oriented 
to.  
 
Less prototypical are cases where the recipient of the apology is a close relation or friend of 
the victim – in these instances the offended party is either absent for some reason, but it is 
conceivable that the apology could be ‘passed on’ to the relevant party. Transportable identity 
remains relevant because it is their association with the transgressed party which is involved in 
the apology.  
 
The most peripheral cases are where a group containing neither the victims themselves, nor 
close relatives is the recipient of the apology. These apologies are usually for historical 
transgressions. Here transportable identity is not at issue, since these institutionally recognised 
representatives of the offended party have not been personally (either directly or indirectly) 
wronged and are recipients by virtue of their discourse identities (as apologisees) and 
situational identities (formal and/or legal recipients) .  
 
 
5.5 Parameter 5: Nature of the uptake 
 
←Less prototypical        More prototypical→  
None    (Rejection/Question sincerity or quality)  Preferred response  
 
Finally, we come to uptake.   Since this study looked only at reactions to the I’m sorry stimuli, 
rather than oral responses, this parameter is suggested in light of work found in Robinson 
(2004) and Murphy (2016).   
 
The most prototypical apologies have uptake which takes the form of the preferred responses 
(in conversation analytic terms) of rejecting the need to apologise or minimising the offence. 
The most peripheral apologies I suggest are ones which have no uptake. This is because no 
uptake usually comes about as a result of the recipient being absent at the time the apology; in 
addition, having no uptake means overhearers cannot judge how the apology has been 
interpreted by the recipient. Between these we have outright rejections and recipients 
questioning the sincerity or quality of the apology. I place these here because they occur more 
frequently than does no response at all, but I do not suggest that one of these responses is more 
prototypical than another.  
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have shown that some language users treat non-canonical instances of I’m sorry 
as apologies proper.  Rather than seeing examples of I’m sorry before face-attacks as a means 
of ramping up the impoliteness of the utterance as a whole, a number see its use as a way of 
attenuating the threat which is to follow.  Treating these examples – and others which might 
be interpreted as merely expressing sympathy – as apologies, we were left with a puzzle of 
how to account for this; since a usual felicity condition approach would likely miss these 
examples (and also would fail to explain the fact that the majority of speakers reject these as 
being apologies). 
 
The solution I proposed to this was, following Jucker & Taavitsainen (2008), to consider 
speech acts as fuzzy concepts and I suggested parameters along which an utterance could be 
considered more or less prototypically apologetic.  A less-than-prototypical apology might 
instead be a prototypical example of an expression of sympathy, which may be viewed as a 
neighbouring speech act. 
 
Aside from helping to account for situations in which language users disagree on whether an 
utterance is a ‘proper’ apology, it also requires the personal experiences of those language users 
to be brought to bear in this decision-making process.  This applies not only to where on each 
of the parameters’ scale of prototypicality a language user places an instance of apology, but 
also to what weighting they give each parameter when it comes to judging the quality of an 
apology.  A limitation of this study has been its focus on I’m sorry as a means of apologising.  
This is, by no means, the only way that speakers apologies – indeed Mills (2003) suggests that 
there are countless ways to apologise.  It may well be that language users apply these same 
parameters on apologetic utterances which do not include a more or less explicit token of 
apology.  This would merit further investigation. 
 
Further work on how users react to mismatching im/politeness is required to see, amongst other 
things, how strong the influence of prosody is.  It may be possible to exploit ongoing 
developments in the use of event-related potentials in neurolinguistics and experimental 
pragmatics which show up extra processing effort to see whether these clashes take longer to 
process when usual apology intonation is used versus a more marked prosodic pattern. 
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